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INSTITUTIONALIZED TRUSTEESHIP: AVENUES OF
COMPENSATION REFORM
THE trust function of providing security for life beneficiaries has, in recent
years, vastly overshadowed the function of trusts as a conduit for the trans-
mittal of family fortunes to remaindermen. 1 As both interest rates and
purchasing power have declined, the demand for active and expert super-
vision of trust investments has become intensified. 2 To assure such super-
vision, an increasing number of settlors are employing banks and other
corporate institutions as their trustees.3 This trend, coupled with the will-
ingness, indeed aspiration, of corporate fiduciaries to serve,4 has resulted
in their phenomenal increase in size and number during the past fifty years.5
1. See Bardt, Trust Management Static or Dynamic, 28 TRUST BULL. 2, 4 (Dec.
1948); Stone, Life Tenant vs. Remainderman, 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 530, 531 (1947).
For the traditional view espousing the custodial functions, see Headley, Trustees or
"Gentlemen Adventurersf" 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 91 (1949).
2. See Shattuck, The Trustee's Duty to Invest, 86 TRUSTS & ESTATES 119 (1948),
where fluctuations in purchasing power since 1800 are tellingly presented to support tile
necessity for focusing attention on the protective functions of trusteeship. See, also,
Shattuck, New Theory of Trust Management, 84 TRusTs & EsTATES 185 (1947). Tile
trend of interest rates is indicated by the decreasing yield on Moody's triple A bonds:
1920, 6.12%; 1930, 4.55%; 1935, 3.6%; 1947, 2.48%. See Lowell, The Problem of Trust
Costs and Charges and Suggested Remedies, 27 TRusT BULL. 16, 18 (Nov. 1947),
3. All but approximately 100 of the 2976 trust institutions are either banks with
trust departments or trust companies with banking departments. Stephenson, Trust
Business in the United States, 1947, 27 TRUsT BuLL. 19, 20 (Apr. 1948). For the sake
of convenience, the descriptive term "trust department" will occasionally be used where
the principles being discussed are applicable to all trust institutions.
4. There was a time when trustees were not looked upon kindly if they thrust them-
selves forward rather than await selection. See May v. May, 167 U.S. 310, 322 (1897);
SERS, A TREATISE ON TRUST Co. LAW § 13 (1917). However, extensive promotional
activities are now a well established practice of trust institutions. See Stephenson, Trust
Advertising, 28 TRusT BuLr- 19 (Jan. 1949); WELDON, NEW BUSINESS FOR TE TRUST
DEPARTMENT (1933). Lawyers have been particularly critical of this so-called "will
chasing." See, e.g., Johnson, The Unfair Competition of Trust Companles, 22 CAN. B.
Rsv. 422 (1944). Several states have responded by regulating the solicitation of fiduciary
appointments. AR. STAT. ANN. 571 (Pope, Gum. Supp. 1944); N.H. REV. LAWS, C. 312,
§ 13 (1942); WAsH. REv. STAT. §3231(9)* (Remington, 1932); cf. 32 MAss. L.Q. 14
(1947) (memorandum on one of the half dozen bills proposed in Massachusetts).
5. In 1895 there were an estimated 569 trust companies with total resources in excess
of $962,000,000. PERINE, STATEMENT OF TnE GRowT31 AND PREsENT STATUS OF TRUST
ComnAxtms IN THE UNITED STATES (1905) (unpaginated reprint of address before Trust
Company Section of A.B.A.). In 1947, 2976 companies controlled $36,162,161,448 of
personal trust property. Stephenson, Trust Business in the United States, 1947, 27 TRusT
BULL. 19, 21 (Apr. 1948) ; 86 TRusTs & EsTATES 206 (1948). The number of companies
has dropped since the peak in the 1920's. Drake, Thirty Years Back and a Look Ahead
i; Trust Administration, 79 TRUSTS & ESTATES 555,556 (1944) ; see LEE, PERSONAL TRusT
.AnMrisaATrioNr 1 (1934). But there has been a significant gain in assets particularly
.since 1941. See AMERICAN BANKERS AssOcIATIoN, PRESENT DAY BANKING, 1947-1948
195 (Kuhns ed. 1947) (cited hereafter as PRESENT DAY BANKING).
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The corporate trustee has little in common with the old-line fiduciary, who
was content with an honorarium awarded under a rule-of-thumb system as
his material return. The new-style fiduciary is understandably impelled
by the profit motive. Yet the service of corporate trustees should be avail-
able to beneficiaries at the lowest reasonable price. These conflicting inter-
ests can be fairly reconciled only if the system of compensation is geared
to the cost of doing business. Since the current system is not, new methods
of reimbursing trustees should be examined.
EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE TRUSTEE
Testators and settlors, while cognizant of the many merits of individual
fiduciaries,6 early recognized the desirability of securing continuous trustee-
ship.7 Colonial probate records are interspersed with numerous instances
in which several co-executors were appointed to administer an estate 8 or in
which the church was requested to fulfill this function.' A forecast of future
development came at the end of the 18th Century when trustees for private
funds devoted to specific limited purposes were first incorporated.' 0 The
embryo of the modem corporate fiduciary, however, did not develop until
1818, when the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company began to
perform specilized trust service.' In the following two decades, marked
6. No attempt will be made here to weigh the arguments concerning the advantages
of the corporate over the individual trustee. The following have been the principle ad-
vantages claimed: permanency, protective facilities, e.-perience and specialization, financial
responsibility, collective knowledge and judgment, and extra-judicial government supervi-
sion. See STFPHEN SoN, THE AmImacax SYsM oF TRusT Busnr-Ess 15-9 (1936); Jour-
neay, Are Yo, Missing Trst Brsinwss? 41 BANKING 40,41 (Oct. 1948). An extremely crit-
ical approach is taken by KELLY, How TO LosE YoUR MoNEY Pnmrm.ay (1933) passim.
See the debate between Leverett Saltonstal, speaking for the professional individual trustee,
and Frederick A. Carroll, representing the professional corporate trustee, in Is There a
Field for the Professional Trustee, 67 TRUST Co. 136 (193S).
7. Smr, THE DEvELoPmENT OF TRUST Coo.Azms m 'nT UNUTO STATcs (1923)
(cited hereafter as SanmH) contains the best account of the corporate trustee's early
growth. In addition, see STmIEP sox, TRUST BusLxxss nT Co =,oz LAw COUN'MnUS
538-40 (1940) ; HIm c, TRUST COMPANIES c. 1 (2d ed. 1915).
S. George Washington, for example, appointed seven executor-trustees ranging
from 19 to 68 years in age. The youngest member of the group closed out the estate
after a 51 year administration. Prussing, George WTashington as Rcal Father of the
Modern Trust Company, 45 TRUST Co. 423 (1927).
9. See, e.g., I MANwAmNG, A DIGEST OF THE EaRLY ComNEcricm P.o.TE Ri~cor.3
5 (1904).
10. Sxrra 234. Early common law forbade a corporation to act as a trustee. But
the legal path was cleared by Attorney General v. Landerfield, 9 Mod. 2,, 83 Eng. Rep.
456 (Ch. 1743); Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 126 (U.S. 1844); Trustees of
Phillips Academy v. King, 12 Tyng 545 (Mass. 1816).
11. The Company's directors assumed the authority to accept trusts from general
clauses in their charter. SirrH 239-40. The first corporation ever specifically granted
trust powers was the Farmers' Fire Insurance and Loan Company (now City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co. of New York City) in 1822. Id. at 246. The first trust business of record
was a guardianship in 1831. STEsH'0nsox, THE Ammc S'sruu. OF TRUsT Busn,'ss
1949]
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as they were by the spectacular growth of urban communities, liquid wealth,
and millionaires, 1 2 the corporate trustee emerged as a recognized institution.
Although considered incidental to such activities as title abstracting and
life, fire and marine insurance,' 3 the early trust business was apparently
profitable.' 4 Prior to 1850, trust funds were usually thought of as funds upon
which the company paid contractual rates of interest, retaining for its
service all sums earned in excess of that rate.'" This business was supple-
mented by trust funds in the modern sense-funds invested for the sole
gain of beneficiaries with the trustee's compensation limited to a set fee.10
But the pattern of corporate trusteeship was not yet fixed. Financial
conditions after 1850 progressively favored the assumption of trust busi-
ness by banking institutions. The panic of 1857 resulted in new capital
adjustments requiring employment of trustees under bond issues at the
very time when banking was evolving into a national system. 17 The ex-
pansion of utilities, corporate organization of businesses and government
financing incident to the Civil War increased personal investment oppor-
tunities and problems.' With the development of the mutual principle
in life insurance and the accompanying abandonment of collateral trust
business, the field was cleared for banker trust companies. 9 Accepting the
opportunity to undertake corporate and personal trust services, trust de-
partments expanded rapidly until in 1905 they controlled resources of over
4 billion dollars-i /10 of the world's aggregate banking power.29 And in
9-10 (1936). This was followed by a living and a testamentary trust (1835), an admin-
istratorship and an executorship (1839), and a trusteeship under a corporate bond issue
(1839). Id. at 9-11. See PERIxE, TE STORY OF THE TRUST COMPANIES (1916).
12. STEPHENSON, TRUST BusINEss IN COMMON LAW CouNTIS 539-40 (1940).
13. SMITH 281-2; AmmCAN INSTITUTE OF BANxING, TRUST FUNCrioNs 15,16 (1927)
(cited hereafter as TRUST FUNcTiONs). A few companies today have reversed this process;
they conduct insurance, abstracting and loan business collateral to their trust functions.
REMINGTON, TRUST BUSINESS IN THE FUTUR 104-8 (1938).
14. See SMITrr 258 n. 3, 319. Compare TRUST FUNCTIONS 16.
15. S rH 316; STEPHENSON, THE AmERiCAN SYSTEM OF TRUST BuSiNEss 10 (1936).
16. SMITH 281, 316.
17. Id. at 284.
18. Id. at 287; REMINGTON, op. cit. sipra note 13, at 35-6; HEmuc, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 10-2, 16-9.
19. Although this process was substantially completed by 1890, SMITH 288, the
last of the trust insurance companies did not separate its activities until 1922 when the
Provident Life and Trust Co. of Philadelphia split into the Provident Mutual Life In-
surance Co. and the Provident Trust Co. STEPHENSON, TRUST BUSINESS IN COMMON
LAW COUNTRIES 543 (1940).
The association of trust with banking activities evoked some criticism in the early
1930's but is apparently unquestioned today. The arguments for and against dissociation
are presented in REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 63-83.
20. PERINE, STATEMENT OF THE GROWTH AND PRESENT STATUS OF TRUST COMPANIES
IN THE UNITED STATES (1905). As many new trust companies were organized from 1899
to 1905 as had been formed during the entire preceeding three-quarters of a century. The
total trust assets in the 1,547 companies then in existence exceeded the total of life in-
surance assets by $1,300,000,000 and the total resources of savings banks by $600,000,000.
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1913 the available trust facilities were materially expanded by adoption of
the Federal Reserve Act 21 which authorized national banks to participate
in these trust activities for the first time.22
Once established, the corporate trustee found an expanding market for
its services. The initial incentive for employment of the trust over other
investment devices was provided by tax advantages.2 In addition, Liberty
Bond drives and prosperity soon combined to make the public investment-
conscious. 24 In 1912, bonds were being shunned by investors as yielding too
little income at 4 to 5%, while corporate obligations were not generally
Ibid. The major portion of this expansion w.as attributable to corporate rather than per-
sonal trust services. PDINGToN, op. cit. smpra note 13, at 37-8. This may tend to e-plain
the 1903 profit of $17,383,60S earned by 81 New York trust companies. Kilburn, Control
and Supervision of Trust Companies, 24 ANxu.s 29,34-5 (1904).
21. 38 STAT. 251 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1946).
22. State banks and trust companies waged a bitter fight to prevent the national banks'
acquisition of fiduciary powers. REmiovox., op. cit. supra note 13, at 37. Spurred by the
serious inroads on the loan and deposit field which were attributed to the lack of uniformity
in the regulation of state institutions possessing charters containing broad grants of power,
national banks conducted a vigorous counter-campaign to secure fiduciary powers for them-
selves. See NEIAx, TRusT EXANATION 14 (1939). The accompanying attempt to
obtain more effective trust company supervision is discussed id. passim. Even after the
initial grant of trust powers in 1913, the national banks were frequently inhibited in their
exercise of such powers by state laws. In 1918, an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act
removed the possibility of discriminatory legislation by gearing the national banhs' fidu-
ciary powers to the like powers exercised by their state competitors under local law. 40
STAT. 968 (1918), 12 U.S.C. §248(k) (1946). These Congressional grants of trust au-
thority were upheld by the courts. Missouri ex rel. Burns Nat. Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S.
17 (1924); First Nat. Bank v. Fellows cx rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917);
see Hamilton v. State, 94 Conn. 648, 110 Atl. 54 (1920). See, generally, Smimw.uso.;
THE Aa.mmc=. Sys=r oF TRUsr BusmN-ss 11, 12 (1936). Of the 2,976 trust institutions,
487o are now national banks, doing 31.7% of the country's trust business. Stephenson,
Trust Business in the United States, 1947, 27 TRUST Buui- 19, 26-7 (Apr. 1948). See
TRUST Furcroxs 17 (1927).
The major functions of the corporate fiduciary-trusteeships for individuals under
will and for individuals and corpor4tions under agreement, executorships, guardianships
and custodial and agency arangements-vere well established by the time national ban:s
entered the field. See SEARS, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 3. Since then, major additions to
functions have come in the administration of life insurance trusts, Horcro:, Lim Ixsur-
AxcE TRUSTS (1933), community trusts, Loomis, Nezw Development in Commv,.ity Trusts,
81 TRUSTS & EsTATs 203 (1945), and employees' trusts, Goldstein, What is New in Or-
ganizing, Amending and Operating Your Pension and Profit-Sharing Trusts? 6 I.sr. Fa.
T.sx. 903 (1948) ; 86 TRUSTs & EsTATEs 41 (1948).
23. While this continues to be an inducement, see Schwalm, Trust Seice at a Profit,
84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 631, 632 (1947), its importance is being considerably reduced in the
income tax field, see Note, Irrevocable Trusts and the Federal Income Tax, 49 YAL L.J.
1305 (1940), and INT. Rnv. CoDE § 51 (b) (all married taxpayers may split their income for
tax purposes), and, to a lesser extent, in the estate tax field. See Bitther, The Church and
Spiegel Cases: Section 811(c) Gets a New Lease of Life, 58 YALt L.J. 825 (1949).
24. Communication to the YAr= LAw Jourus.u from J.ML Johnston, Senior Vice
President, Girard Trust Company, Feb. 1, 1949; TRUST Dwsioir, A.B.A. Gum: ro TnusT
FEEs 31 (1st ed. 1932).
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favored; three-quarters of trust assets were invested in mortgages, with the
balance in real estate and stocks in real estate companies. 25 In the 1920's,
however, investment practices broke from this pattern and developed into
the sharply contrasting pattern of today, when well over 90% of all trust
investments consist of stocks and bonds.2s Settlors recognized that these
investments require more experienced judgment and administrative at-
tention than the predominately mortgage investments of yesteryear. More-
over, as income, inheritance and personal property taxation grew more and
more complex, the services of the corporate trustee as an expert collectively
in law, accounting and business trends became more and more attractive.
The increased expense which accompanied the new complexity of trust
business was alone enough to cause professional trustmen to question
whether their return was worth the capital they had invested. But in ad-
dition, trust companies have been squeezed by a rare combination of events
in the past 20 years. During the last depression, beneficiaries who had been
clamoring for extensive investment activity from their fiduciaries now re-
sorted to the courts for recovery of principal depleted through loose in-
vestment practices. The courts responded by holding the trustees to high
standards of fidelity, under penalty of heavy surcharge.28 At the same time,
falling interest and dividend rates produced a marked decrease in the trust
income on which trustee's fees were largely based. 29 Furthermore, interest
and dividend rates have not yet regained the peak level of the twenties,
while costs have risen with the general level of prices.
Professional trustees have been unable to determine true profit and loss
statistics due to the absence of cost accounting systems."0 Nevertheless,
they have allowed their apprehension that trusteeship was unprofitable to
ripen into a conviction. Many banks have closed their trust departments.3 '
Others have rationalized that the cash loss in the trust department was out-
25. See Drake, supra note 5, at 555. For a case study of the investments in a selected
group of trusts, see RIDDLE, THE INVESTMENT POLICY or TRUST INSTITUTIONS c.c. 9-19
(1934). Trends from 1919 to 1932 in the diversification of real estate, bonds and stocks
are noted id. at 159-60, 173-4.
26. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE ComtoLaER or THE CuRRExcy 178 (1948) (confined to
active national bank trust departments). See note 22 supra.
27. See note 6 supra. For an analysis of the functional details of the tax division in a
modern trust department, see WiLLIAmis, THE TAX DivxsioN OF A TRUST DEPARTMENT
(1949) passim (mimeographed).
It is also likely that the greater responsibility being imposed by law and closer super-
vision by courts and banking authorities led informed individuals to employ the corporate
in preference to the individual trustee. See, generally, Kilburu, supra note 20; NEILAX,
TRUST EXAMINATION (1939).
28. See Moore, A Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases, 96 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 647
(1948), and the cases collected therein.
29. See note 2 supra and p. 931 infra.
30. See pp. 949-51 infra.
31. Drake supra note 5, at 556; Steber, Should Small Banks Have Trust Departments?
88 TRusTs & ESTATES 98 (1949), 28 TRUST BULL. 3 (April 1949) (1948 survey revealing
that 10% of Pennsylvania's trust departments were closed or closing).
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weighed by indirect benefits such as the creation of good will for the banking
institution as a whole. 32 The majority, however, has instituted a concerted
movement to increase rates of compensation. 3 Results of the limited in-
vestigations which have been conducted are substantially of one tenor-
the personal trust business as a whole is being carried at a loss, with only a
few trustees able to maintain the volume of large trusts necessary to achieve
a profit under traditional methods and rates of compensation. 34
The implications of these disclosures are significant for the future of
private trusteeship. If small trusts are to be rejected because unprofitable,
trustees will find themselves riding the ebbing tide of large fortunes. 2A1nd
if a substantial number of trusts are saddled with costs disporportionate to
benefits, either settlors and beneficiaries will be denied the use of the trust
device or legislators will be forced to consider some form of public trustee-
ship as the means for attaining reasonably priced fiduciary services. 35 Both
32. See Rockwell, Ascertaining Cost as Basis of Fair Cornpcnsation for Tnrst Scrv-
ice, 45 TRUST Co. 283, 284 (1927). Securing checking and savings accounts, selling bands
or mortgages to the client and depositing funds awaiting investment in the banking de-
partment were some of the additional benefits stressed. Ibid. And see 27 TRUST Buz.L.
13 (Sept. 1947): W hile trust earnings are small in comparison to total bank profits, they
are not subject to fluctuation in deposits or employment of capital and are thus a factor in
the bank's stability.
33. The Trust Division of the American Bankers Association, in combination vith
local fiduciary groups, provides the organization through which changes are sought. See
Theis, History of Trust Cost Accovnting, 18 TRUST BuL. 23, 24 (Oct. 1938).
34. In 1943, New York's State Banking Department undertook an official study of
trust department earnings and expenses. "The study established the fact that corporate
fiduciaries as a group were losing money on their personal trust business and that conse-
quently trust departments of banks were not making a proper contribution toward the up-
building of capital funds.' ANx. R P. SUPT. OF BAtrcs 6 (N.Y. 1944). The report is
summarized in 76 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 347 (1943); id. at 451; id. at 529; 22 TnusT Bu.
13 (June 1943). While this has been the only investigation by a state supervisory authority,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has also pioneered in official investigation, though on
a more limited scale. See Hoyle, Nrc-w Trust Cost Analysis, 87 TRusms & EsTATzs 171
(1948).
Unofficial statewide studies have been made by banking groups in several states. See
Weig, Trst Costs-A Guide to Trust Fees, 25 TRusT BULL. 3, 4-5 (May 1946) ; 24 TnusT
BuLL 18 (Sept. 1944) (summarizing findings in New Hampshire); Wilson, Pcrnsyl-
vazda's Third Truest-Cost Survey, 21 TRusr Bum. 17 (July-Aug. 1942).
"Generally speaking, the[se] studies showed that corporate trust business vas operat-
ing on a profitable basis and that fees for executorships and administratorships showed a
satisfactory profit. The difficulty lay in the cost of administering trusts under vill, trusts
under agreement and agency accounts." Lowell, supra note 2, at 17.
35. State-operated trust business has been e.\tensively developed in a number of civil
and common law countries. See S'Hn ZSO--Z, STTDms n TRUsT Busumss c. 16 (lst
series 1938) ; STiEsmoN, TRUST Busizss IN Cosasox LAw Cournmms (1940) passirn;
REmGrOx, op. cit. supra note 13, at 21-30. HEAYvum, Punic TnusTZESHiP (1942) dis-
cusses the office of public trustee in England and New Zealand. The pioneering workz of
the latter country is particularly significant: a judicious combination of public trustee-
ship, common trust funds and state guarantee of both principal and income has been of
especial economic and social value to the administration of small accounts. Specifically,
the office has become an e-perimental clinic for the improvement of trust law and pro-
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the trustman and the trust user are thus notably interested in possibilities
of compensation reform.
TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF COMPENSATION
The United States early rejected the English common law notion of
honorary trusteeships, under which remuneration was forbidden lest the
trustee overload the trust with costs and precipitate contention as to the
value of his services.3 Rather, in this country, the theory developed that
the amount of compensation is open to negotiation between the settlor and
trustee. 7 In addition, beneficiaries are allowed to remunerate the trustee
and their contract to that effect is enforced.
3 8
Absent any such provision by the parties, a trustee is entitled to the
cedure through such innovations as low cost legal counsel and a near-minimum of refer-
ence to the courts, investment and managerial practices have been refined, id. at 107, and
the unmatched continuity and security of the state has been a factor in the popularity of
the office's services. Id. at 111. Moreover, New Zealand's public trustee provides an ideal
agency for the management of a number of different kinds of public and quasi-public funds,
Id. at 107.
In this country, the germ of public trusteeship exists in about half the states in the
form of a public administrator for certain intestate estates. See STEPHENSON, STUDIES IN
TRUST BUSINESS 241-2 (1st series 1938). Whether this rudimentary beginning will ripen
into public trusteeship may depend on the success of privately conducted common trust
funds. See pp. 933-40 infra. Cf. Jacobs & Cahn, The Fiduciary of the Future, 5 Sr. JOHNS
L. REv. 32, 41 (1930), advocating the transformation of American trust companies into
public trustees as a step toward compelling settlors to select fitting fiduciaries to adminis-
ter trust funds. Some of the practical questions which would have to be met if public trustee-
ship is adopted in the United States, are raised by HEANEY, op. cit. supra, at 109-13.
36. See Robinson v. Pett, 3 P.Wms. 249, 251, 24 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Ch. 1734) ; Barney
v. Saunders, 16 How. 534, 541 (U.S.1853). Although this is still the general rule in Eng-
land even today, there are a number of important exceptions, including fixed fees for the
Public Trustee. See VicxanY, LAW AND AccouNTS OF ExECUTORs, A mNismATvORS AND
TRUSTEES 103 (7th ed. 1943). Cf. CoswAy, THE TRUST AccouNTANT'S GUIDE 78-81
(1930) (indirect benefits). The early American and English cases are reviewed in Mus-
cogee Lumber Co. v. Hyer, 18 Fla. 698 (1882).
The general American rule allowing the trustee a reasonable profit applies in both
testamentary and inter vivos trusteeships. Illinois is the major exception. Like a num-
ber of other states, e.g., Walton v. Gairdner, 111 Ga. 343, 36 S.E. 666 (1900), Illinois holds
that the right to compensation is purely statutory. Cook v. Gilmore, 133 Ill. 139, 24 N.E.
524 (1890). Since the Illinois statute granting reasonable compensation does not include
inter vivos trustees, they are denied compensation unless the trust instrument provides
otherwise. Bennett v. Weber, 323 Ill. 283, 154 N.E. 105 (1926).
37. 4 BoraRT, THE LAw or TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 975 (1948); 2 Scorr, THn LAW
OF TRUSTS § 242.4 (1939) (cited hereafter as BOGERT and Scorr respectively). This may
in fact be a one-sided privilege weighed in favor of the trustee: attempts by the settlor to
avoid by stipulation what he believes to be a harsh statutory levy are frequently negated by
the courts and statutes permitting the trustee to elect the statutory fee. See Comment,
Compensation of Fiduciaries, 42 YALE L.J. 771, 773-8 (1933); Note, 161 A.L.R. 870
(1946).
38. Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881); Ladd v. Pigott, 215 Mo. 361, 114 S.W.
984 (1908). But cf., HAWAiI REv. LAWS § 9757 (1945) (contracts between trustee and
beneficiary void if compensation is in excess of statutory rate).
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compensation prescribed by the legislature or the court. If there is no
controlling statute, the trustee is guaranteed compensation which is ju-
dicially "reasonable." 9 Where a statute covers the matter, it either ex-
pressly directs the court to make a discretionary award of "reasonable"
compensation, 4 or it sets out a schedule to be followed in all cases. 41
The usual practice has been to compute the income commission, the major
portion of the fee, on the basis of an agreed or statutory percentage of the
trust income, the theory being that this constitutes reimbursement for
current expenses. 42 In many states, this percentage is graduated downward
as the size of the trust increases. 43 The lesser part of the trustee's compen-
sation, the principal commission, is intended to constitute a reasonable
margin of profit.44 Traditionally, this has been levied only at the termination
of the trust or the particular trustee's duties, regardless of their duration."5
39. RESTATEzArxT, TRUSTS § 242; State Nat. Bank v. Fisher, 186 Ark. 42, 52 S.V24
51 (1932) ; ef. Hayward v. Plant, 93 Conn. 374, 119 Ad. 341 (1923).
Compensation for national banks is governed by the law of the state in w.,hich they
are located. 12 CoDE FED. IZEGs. § 206.14 (193S). If there is no state regulation on the
subject and no provision in the instrument, reasonable compensation is assured. Ibid.
40. E.g., ILL. STAT. ANx. c. 148, § 31 (Smith-Hurd, 1936) ; PA. STAT. Am:n. tit. 20,
§ 3271 (Purdon, 1930) (see note 36 supra) ; cf. a.,nE Rnv. STAT. c. 140, § 44 (1944)
(placing a maximum limit on the court's discretion); MAss. Gu. LAws C. 206, § 16 (1932)
(reasonable basis applies to all fiduciary duties). The Montana statute distinguishes be-
tveen testamentary trustees and trustees under a declaration of trust. The former are
granted "reasonable compensation." fozr. REv. CoDE § 10353 (1935). The latter are
given fees in accordance -with the statutory schedule for executors if the instrument is
silent, reasonable compensation if the instrument directs that compensation be given with-
out setting the rate, and the trust instrument rate if one has been specified. Id. at § 7918.
The state statutes on both executors and trustees compensation are collected in Comment,
Compensation of Fiduciaries, 42 Y=Ar L. J. 771 (1933).
41. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 386.180 (Baldwin, 1943) ; N.Y. Civm Pn.4cncn AcT § 1543;
N.Y. Sum. CoUR.T AcT § 285.
42. See 2 Scott 1268-70.
43. 2 Scorr 1384. This is particularly true of contractual schedules. See White, Aw
Trends in Trust Compensation, 28 TRusr Btu.. 13, 25-9 (Oct. 1948). Statutes also recog-
nize, through graduated rates, the fact that costs do not generally increase in proportion
to trust size. E.g., N.Y. Sum Coter Acr § 285-a (6% on the first §2000 of annual income,
37a on the next $10,000, and 2% on the balance). But cf., Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 36.180 (Bald-
win, 1943). And where the fiduciary operates under a reasonable compensation doctrine,
the size of the estate will be considered as a factor in awarding the total commission, sce
In re Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 209, 66 AUt. 354, 355 (1907), although the actual
award may not be computed on a graduated scale. In re Gardner's Estate, 3-23 Pa. 229,
185 At. 804 (1936).
44. "It is the compensation on principal at the termination of the trust which is sup-
posed to wipe out the loss in carrying the account through the years and give the trustee a
fair profit." PREsENT DAY BAN=ING 194. There is usually no principal compensation where
the trust is perpetual. See Drueding, Fees for Charitable Trnsts, 83 Tnusrs & Esmwzs
239 (1946).
45. See Note, Compensation of a Resigning Executor, Adninislrator or Trustee, 20
NoTRE DAmm LAW. 53, 55 (1944), and STEPHENSON, COMPENSATION Pnoviso,:s or Wxxxs
AND TRuST AGEEMENTs 7 (1941). Cf. Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615, 31 A.2d 132 (1943)
1949]
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Because these traditional measures of compensation bear no direct re-
lationship to costs or to the skill and responsibility of the trustee, many
beneficiaries are undoubtedly paying for services never received while con-
tributing toward services rendered to others. At the same time, the rela-
tively burdensome expense discourages trustees from assuming duties in
trusts of less than $25,000, 46 thereby largely depriving the moderate income
class of the benefits of modern trust methods. Moreover, the frequently
unprofitable status of their personal trust business as a whole 47 tends to
cause the companies to saddle other fiduciary activities or other divisions
of the bank with unjustifiable costs.
CONFOI MING COMPENSATION TO SERVICES
Approaching the problem through costs
The increased expense of trust work, and the high variance in cost with
each trust, have recently led to experimentation with new devices for giving
trustees deserved compensation, while at the same time protecting settlors
and beneficiaries from unjust charges.
Size as a cost factor. The availability of institutionalized trusteeship to
the small trust is a matter of vital concern to both settlors and trust com-
panies. The need for trust services is unrelated to size: the beneficiary of a
small estate may be fully as unfit for the management of the property on
which he is dependent as the beneficiary of a large trust.4 And, in this era
of small estates, the trust companies may lose out in the competition for the
(guardianship) ; see Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn.
472, 477-8, 200 At. 809, 811 (1938). See note 162 infra.
46. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 5, at 559; HEANEY, op. cit. supra note 35, at 108. A
recent national survey showed 54% of 144,081 trusts handled by corporate fiduciaries had
an annual income of less than $1200. 27 TRUST BULL. 3, 4 (Sept. 1947). These statistics
would seem to indicate that trustmen as a whole are sympathetic toward the management
of small trusts. The fact is, however, that, whether they like it or not, trust companies
cannot control the accumulation of numerous unprofitable accounts which is due to the
creation of a number of small trusts out of a large testate estate, the split of a large trust
during distribution, or the acceptance of small accounts where business pressures intervene.
See STEPHENSON, STUDIES IN TRUST BUSINESS 309 (1st series 1938). The further fact
that most if not all the trust companies actively soliciting small accounts are those with
common trust funds, Stephenson, Taking Trust Service to the People, 27 TRusT BULL.
37, 50 (Nov. 1947), tends to corroborate the general view that trustmen as a whole are
reluctant to administer small trusts.
Certainly, the surface has hardly been scratched in the development of a market for
corporate fiduciary services to the moderate income class. One survey indicates that only
6% of the probated estates between $5,000 and $10,000 are going to the corporate trustees.
Schwalm, Trust Service at a Profit, 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 631, 632 (1947) (large Indiana
county). And in some localities, not over 25% of even the more substantial estates are
settled by trust institutions. PREsENT DAY BANKING 195; cf. 80 TRUSTS & ESTATES 7
(1945).
47. See note 34 smpra.
48. STEPHENSON, STUDIES IN TRUST BUSINESS 254 (1st series 1938).
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only substantial source of personal savings unless they meet the need for
trusteeship by selling their fiduciary services to the moderate investor.0
But the management of small trusts is an inefficient and expensive service.
Not only is the beneficiary of a $25,000 fund unable to reap the investment
advantages accruing to his $250,000 counterpart, but the administrative
costs of the smaller trust are about four times as great per $1000 of corpus.r 3
Consequently, the corporate trustee must either charge a very high propor-
tionate fee in order to cover costs or else render only a perfunctory service
limited largely to investment in government bonds.51
Graduation of compensation rates downward as the trust principal and
income increase is a partial recognition by courts and legislatures of the
fact that large trusts cost proportionately less to administer than do small
ones. 52 But if this principle were carried to the point where a trustee could
recoup the cost of every trust, small trusts could not bear the burden of
expense. Only an attack on the problems of efficiency and cost will make
graduated rates practicable.
Insurance companies and savings banks built their business on the ef-
ficient handling of small accounts through mass investment. 3 The use of
this technique was denied to trust companies by the common law prohibition
against commingling trust funds.54 And when a few corporate trustees
experimented with commingled funds under contractual arrangements with
settlors, the funds were promptly declared associations subject to taxation
at the corporate rate.-5
Congress removed this tax barrier in 1936, however, by exempting all
49. See Headley, Day after Tomorrow It Trusteeslip, S0 TRuSTs & EsrATES 9, 12-3
(1945). Williams, Modent Concept of the Trust Dczqce, 23 TRUST BULI. 10, 11-4 (Nov.
1948), lists as the major competitors the purveyors of pure savings service such as banks,
building and loan associations and the United States Government, the insurance companies
(particularly through life insurance options) and investment bankers and brokers.
50. See Stephenson, Administering Small Trusts, 25 TnusT BuL. 25, 30-1 (Nov.
1945). But see the tempering factors mentioned by Bardt, Expanding Horikons for Tnist
Business, 79 TRUSTS & ESTATES 537, 538 (1944) (larger estates generate major problems
in taxation, accounting, investment and real estate management), and Lasseter, Ta~sig
Guesswork Out of Trust Costs, 85 TRUSTS & ESTATES 57, 123 (1947) (some accounts
with a minimum fee of $25 prove profitable where there is little activity).
51. See HA.NEY, op. cit. supra note 35, at 103; RiDLr, op. cit. supra note 25, at 44.
52. See note 50 supra.
53. STEPHENSON, STUDIES IN TRUST BusINsS 260-2 (1st series 1933). Australia,
New Zealand, Denmark and Norway are among the countries which have applied this
approach to the management of fiduciary funds. Ibid.
54. See, e.g., Doud v. Holmes, 64 N.Y. 635 (1875). The strict prohibition against
mingling personal funds with trust funds was extended to require the separate "earmark-
ing" of the investments of each trust. See Legislation, 37 CoL L. REv. 13S4, 13S5 (1937).
55. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, SO F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1936) ; cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Graves, 272 N.Y. 1, 3 N.E2d 612 (1936), ccrt.
denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937) (N.Y. income tax). The present tax status of the funds is
discussed in Dalton, Tax Aspects of Common Trust Fiaids, 87 TRusTs & Esrxrs 185
(1948).
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common trust funds from corporate taxes where they were maintained by
a bank exclusively for the investment of fiduciary funds 11 and in conformity
with regulations to be established by the Federal Reserve Board." Tying
the tax exemption to the Board's regulation assured uniform control over
the development of all common funds, whether established in state or na-
tional institutions. But in the absence of contractual permission for commin-
gling, neither state nor national banks can use the device unless there is also
a state enabling statute.5 Some seventeen states and the District of Colum-
bia have yet to pass such acts. 9
Although the practice is now rare, settlors may themselves authorize
participation in a common trust fund," except in the few states which ex-
plicitly prohibit such funds.6 These so-called "contract funds" are either
"legal," in that they confine the investment power of the trustee to secU-
rities on a "legal list" established by statute,12 or, more usually, "discre-
56. Congress evidently had no intention of allowing fiduciaries to embark on a pro-
gram of selling participations to the general public for investment purposes; at least that
is the interpretation given to the Act by the Board in requiring the funds to be employed
only for bona fide fiduciary purposes. 12 CODE FED. REGS. § 206.17(a) (1938). Uncertainty
as to the meaning of "bona fide" purpose caused some fiduciaries to hesitate in establishing
the funds for fear that they might breach the requirement and lose the tax exemption. For
the initial doubts, see Fletcher, Legal Uncertainties Point to Slow Devclopmnclt, 67 TRUsT
Co. 162 (1938). But the general language was used to prevent unduly hampering develop-
ment of the device, 26 FED. REs. BuLL 393 (1940), and it now appears clear that sound
judgment and a good faith attempt to live up to the requirement will not be penalized. See
Wingfield, Prohibition Against Use of Common Trust Funds as Investment Trusts, 21
TRuST BuLL. 20 (Mar. 1942); 12 CoDE FED. REcs. §206.102 (Supp. 1947) (quashing at-
tempts by small corporations to cast their contingency reserves into revocable trust form
and invest in common trust funds. To avoid the appearance of offering a common fund to
the investing public at large, advertisement and publication of earnings and assets has been
strictly circumscribed. 12 CODE FED. REGS. § 206.17 (Supp. 1945).
57. Revenue Act of 1936 § 169, 49 STAT. 1708 (1936). For the Board's regulation, see
12 CoDE Fmn. REGs. § 206.17 (1938), as amended, 12 CoDE Fan. Rws. § 206.17 (Cum. Supp.
1944), 12 CODE FED. REGS. § 206.17 (Supp. 1945).
58. 12 CODE FED. REDs. § 206.17(a) (1938).
59. The Uniform Common Trust Fund Act, presented to the states for passage in
1939, has been enacted into law by 14 states. E.g., WASH. REv. STAT. §§ 3388-3388-6
(Remington, Supp. 1943). Several others have passed their own enabling acts. E.g., ICY.
REv. STAT. § 287.230 (Baldwin, Cum. Supp. 1949). Some of the states have added exten-
sive statutory requirements to the Board's regulation. E.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c
(Baldwin, 1938). The thirty statutes are collected in an appendix to TRUST Divisou,
A.B.A., CoMMoN TRuST FuNDs 69 (2d ed. 1948) (cited hereafter as ComoN TRUST
FuNDs) and in 8 P-H TRUST SmwV. 1 15,101, 15,301 (1948). Missouri is the only state to
approve the funds at common law. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman, 235 Mo. App,
559, 140 S.W.2d 68 (1940).
60. The first funds were of this type. Stephenson, A Decade of Common Trust Punds,
33 BANKING 46 (Jan. 1941). Since 1937, interest has centered on procuring enabling legis.
lation. CommoN TRUST FUNDS 12.
61. E.g., OKLA. STAT. AxN, tit. 60, § 175.46 (1949).
62. "The legal fund is one that is limited to securities in which under statutory law'a
[l,58: 924
INSTITUTIONALIZED TRUSTEESHIP
tionary," in that they grant discretionary powers allowing a far broader
choice of investments. 3 Ordinarily, however, common trust funds are set
up under the authority of enabling statutes. Like contract funds, these
statutory funds may be confined by statute either to securities on the legal
list or to securities appropriate for investment by each participating trust's
instrument.64 The legal-discretionary distinction, however, is non-existent
in states following the "prudent man" investment rule, which prescribes
discretionary investment.65
Major advances in internal trust management have been made possible
by the common trust funds for general investment permitted under the
Board's regulation." Ordinarily established by declaration of trustPr the
fund exists as an entity separate from both the trustee's assets and the
participating estates.3 Although legal title to the corpus is held by the
company as trustee, each participating fiduciary account owns a propor-
trustee may invest without specific extension of its investment powers by the terms of the
trust." Coa-iox TRust Fuxus 19.
63. See id. at 12, 20-1. Difficulties which a draftsman must face when drawing the
investment clause of a trust are discussed in Comment, Trust Investment Clauses: A Prob-
lem for Draftsmev, 58 YALE L. J. 28 (1949). General considerations in the choice of
investment power are taken up in id. at 289-91.
64. Commox TrusT FuNDs 12.
65. States where the "prudent man" rule is in effect are listed in Comment, 58 Yamm
L.J. 288, 292 n.14 (1949).
66. 12 CODE FED. REos. § 206.17(c) (1938).
Special provision is also made for common trust funds invested primarily in real estate
mortgages. 12 CODE FED. Rr.Gs. § 206.17(d) (Cum. Supp. 1944). While state-sanctioned
mortgage participation was an important investment technique before the Board authorized
common funds, see Comment, Participation Mortgages as a Method of Trust Investmcnt
by Corporate Fiduciaries, 45 YI. L.J. 857 (1936), the depression experience was unfavor-
able, see Note, 34 COL. L. REv. 663, 667-74 (1934), and, so far as is known, no mortgage
participations have been established under the Board's regulation. Cos-zio TrusT Fu::Ds
22.
A third type of common fund, the "1200 Fund," is designed to provide a flexible tool
for the investment of very small accounts, the maximum participation for any one trust
being $1200. 12 CODE FED. REGs. § 206.17(b) (1938). This size limitation has so dis-
couraged its use, that only 4 such funds are extant, Fenninger, Common Trust Ftnds-
Ten Years of Development in the United States, 27 Tnusr BuL. 30, 33 (Feb. 1948), but
lack of the formalized regulation characteristic of the general funds may be an incentive for
future expansion of this provision. See Stephenson, Tahing Trust Seriice to the People, 27
TRuST BmrLL. 37, 50-1 (Nov. 1947).
67. Earlier formal devices for establishing the funds are discussed in Legislation, Com-
mingled Investment by Corporate Fiduciaries in Pennsylvania, 87 U. op PA. L. Rnv. 577,
580-2 (1939), and RmiDLE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 47-0. Instructions on drafting the
plans used since the Board's regulation are contained in Co zioN TnusT Fvzms cA.
68. See Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 463, 67 N.Y.S2f 444, 447 (Surr.
Ct. 1946) (common fund accounting action): "A new agency for aggregating multiple
interests was created and regulated and shares in it were made lawful for investment by
trustees. This concept of the common trust fund requires the court to deal with such a
fund as an entity separate from the trustee and separate from the individual estates whose
moneys are invested in participations in the fund."
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tionate equitable interest and enjoys the benefits or suffers the losses rat-
ably. 9 No individual trust may have an interest in excess of $50,000 or
10% of the fund, whichever is less.70
Benefits accruing to beneficiaries of the small trust through participation
in a commingled fund can hardly be overemphasized. The high degree of
supervision necessitated by the Federal Reserve Board's regulations 71 and
allowed by the efficiencies accompanying mass investment permits far
greater diversification 72 and the judicious timing of purchases and sales.7"
Moreover, periodic distributions of principal can now be made without the
necessity for keeping considerable amounts of uninvested assets on hand.74
69. CommoN TRUST FUNDS 24.
70. 12 CoD FE. R GS. § 206.17 (c) (5) (Supp. 1945). For the interpretation where
a settlor has created more than one trust, see 34 FED. RES. BULL. 1113 (1948).
At establishment of the fund, an initial valuation of the assets is made and "units of
participation" defined on this basis. The majority of trustees have initially valued each
unit at $10. The value of a unit at any time thereafter is its proportionate part in the
value of the whole fund. See CommoN TRUST FUNDS 26. No additions or withdrawals
are permitted until one of the periodic valuation dates. 12 CoDE FED. Rrs, § 206.17
(c) (Supp. 1945). It is not necessary that the entire assets of a participating trust be in-
vested in the fund and in fact they are not in many cases. Ward, The Rise of Common
Trust Funds, 34 BANKING 32, 82 (Nov. 1941). Thus, within the maximum participating
limits, large trusts may enjoy the benefits of common trust funds.
71. E.g., quarterly valuations of the fund's assets, prompt segregation of all invest-
ments which become ineligible, complete review of all investments to determine safety and
current value at least once every twelve months, review of all investments to determine
their eligibility for each trust whenever a participant withdraws. See the detailed specifi-
cation of duties in Commomr TRUST FUNDs 44-8.
72. Forty-three institutions reporting to the American Bankers Association revealed
the following diversification record on commingled funds. Type of security- 48.57
bonds and cash; 15.5% preferred stock; 34.2% common stock; 1.87 FHA mortgages.
Fields of investment: 37.1% governments and municipals; 13.4% utilities; 5.6% railroads;
38.5% industrials; 3.6% financial; 1.8% FHA mortgages. McHale, Commoni Trust Funds
Not So Common Yet, Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, Feb. 28, 1949,
p. 13, cols. 1-2; 88 TRUSTS & ESTAXES 156 (1949). See Stephenson, Present-Day Prac-
tices in Diversification of Trust Investments, 24 TRUST BULL. 14, 17 (Sept. 1944) for a
discussion of the factors which limit diversification in individually invested accounts.
There are some securities, such as Canadian bonds not paying interest in American
dollars and securities of companies regularly distributing certain stock dividends, which
are appropriate for individual investment but not for a common fund. See Blakemore,
Common Trust Fund Experience in California, 87 TRUSTS & ESTATES 35, 39 (1948). And
for the pro and con of mortgages as fund investments compare Lambing, Mortgages for
Common Trust Funds, 75 TRUSTS & ESTATES 65 (1942), with Whittlesey, Liquidity it
Common Trust Funds, 75 TRUSTS & ESTATES 167 (1942).
73. Matthews, Investments for Common Trust Funds, 83 TRUSTS & EsTATES 81
(1946). Much more may also be achieved in selecting individual securities for their
quality (high, medium or speculative grade) and in varying the maturities of bonds to
the greatest advantage. Id. at 82. Moreover, the ability to take security offerings in
large blocks will save the odd lot's commission and ofttimes result in a more favorable
price. Barton, Economies for the Small Trust in the Use of Common Trust Funds, 25
TRUST BULL. 5, 12-3 (Jan. 1946) ; Stuebner, Investment Advantages of the Connon Trust
Fund, 21 TRUST BULL. 25, 27 (Mar. 1942).
74. Stephenson, A Decade of Common Trust Funds, 33 BANKING 46 (Jan. 1941).
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The resulting increase and stabilization of investment returns has enhanced
the value of trusteeship to the income beneficiaries." And the better con-
servation of assets stemming from absorption by the common fund of losses
which would substantially deplete the principal of an individual trust
inures to the benefit of remaindermen.
76
To fiduciaries, the most appealing aspects of the common trust fund are
the superior economies and efficiencies which it introduces into trust ad-
ministration. Operational savings of from 27% to 50% have been reported
wherever the plan has been tried.7' The primary saving, of course, derives
from the efficiencies obtained by handling the investment of a number of
trusts as a single unit,78 and possibilities of costly surcharges are reduced
by the improved management techniques.77 In addition, the more fre-
quent review of investments in the common fund yields useful information
applicable as well to the fiduciary's non-participating trusts containing
identical securities.6
75. See, e.g., Stevenson, Experience uith a Common Trust Fund, 87 Tnusrs & Es-
TATES 539, 540 (1948) (reporting an increased yield of 125o to participating ac-
counts) ; Blakemore, supra note 72, at 35.
76. During the depression, trusts participating in common funds fared substantially
better than non-participating trusts of similar size. Fenninger, sutra note 66, at 35.
77. McHale, supra note 72, at p. 13, col. 3; Comoi TnusT Fu:.ns 14. There vill
of course be a period in which savings will be offset by the costs of establishing the fund.
Barton, supra note 73, at 6-7. But once the fund is established, the unit costs decline at
a rate accelerated by the growth of the fund itself and the reduction of overall expenses.
Whittlesey, The Post-War Trust Department Dollar and Common Trust Ftnds, 24 Tanus
BuLl. 21, 24 (Nov. 1944).
While no commission may be charged for operating common funds, 12 Cooz Fim.
R.os. § 206.17 (c) (8) (1938), savings through efficiency more than compensate the
trustee. "Four of the largest Philadelphia trust companies have made cost studies which
indicate that they are in a position to take on any sized trust account with the certainty
of doing so without loss, provided there are obtained [annual] fees of 7 of 1% [of prin-
cipal] (with a minimum charge of $25) and the assurance that the account vill be in-
vested entirely in the fund. Furthermore, these studies indicate that a $25,000 account
fully invested in the fund costs somewhere between $45 and $50 so that with a I of 1a
rate, there is an indicated profit of at least $75 per account... [E]ven on the smallest
account, it is possible for the trustee to at least break even." Whittlesey, =spra, at 24.
78. "The operation of a common trust fund is practically an investment job, while the
bookkeeping and mechanical work of operating a common fund is minimal. With our fund
of $17,000,000 the total bookkeeping cost is only about $800 per annum, being a part-time
job for one man." Barton, supra note 73, at 12 (quoting a Philadelphia trustman). Spe-
cific operational savings are achieved in the reduction in such activities as handling seuri-
ties, clipping coupons, addressograph work, rendering periodic statements, and, above all,
in setting up and making investment reviews. Id. at 9-12; Whittlesey, Cosnmon Trist
Funds Offer Bright Future for the Trust Business, 23 TRyst BUuL. 19, 23 (May 1944)
(reporting a reduction of 7200 investment items during three and three-qurter years of
operation).
79. Reduction of shrinkage and loss by means of diversification also reduces the
chances of a surcharge. Barton, supra note 73, at 13.
80. The First National Bank and Trust Company of Bridgeport, Connecticut, for
example, reported a practice of including in the common fund all securities on the ap-
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So far, only 57 institutions have established common funds."1 This may
be explained in part by the conviction of pioneers in such funds that con-
servative unhurried, development of the new device was essential.82 But
other factors have weighed heavily in the trustmen's mincing approach.
Imperfect realization of the extent to which commingling can produce
savings and accompanying profits has been a major deterrent."3 The ne-
cessity for procuring state enabling statutes 4 and later amending the un-
duly restrictive ones to permit discretionary investment 85 have contributed
to the delay. And a widespread but false belief that the required book-
keeping is complicated has undoubtedly discouraged some trustees.
8 I
proved list and reviewing these securities monthly and, at times, even weekly. 25 TRUST
BULL. 35 (Dec. 1945). The fund is thus a valuable aid in crystalizing investment ideas
and effectuating investment policies. Redman, Setting Up a Common Trust Fund, 87
TRUSTS & ESTATES 433, 436 (1948). Stuebner, supra note 73, at 26, sets out a procedure
for policy formulation: weekly review of common fund holdings and transactions by (1) an
investment advisory committee, (2) an executive committee, and (3) the board of direc-
tors.
81. The sixty-nine funds which they maintain total $400,000,000, MeHale, supra note
72, at p. 13, col. 1, and vary in size from $464,000 to $42,000,000. 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES
156 (1949).
82. Fenninger, supra note 66, at 32.
83. Whittlesey, Common Trust Funds Offer Bright Future for the Trust Business,
23 TRUST BULL. 19, 23 (May 1944).
84. See notes 58 and 59 supra.
85. See, e.g., Anderson, Practical Aspects in Common Tnst Fund Creation and Ad-
ministration, 27 TRUST BULL. 13, 21 (Dec. 1947): "For all practical purposes we [in
Ohio] are restricted to government bonds for our legal accounts, and for that reason
haven't thought there was much advantage in establishing a legal fund." This same at-
titude once prevailed in New York where no funds were established at all under the
enabling act until discretionary funds were sanctioned seven years after the act's original
passage. See Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 462, 67 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (Surr.
Ct. 1946); Maull, Answering Objections to Common Trust Fund, 79 TRusTs & ESTATES
•55 (1944).
86. Compare Clifford, Commingled Trust Funds, 11 HARv. Bus. Rav. 253 (1933)
(bookkeeping unduly burdensome), with Robinson, Accounting Records for Common
Trust Funds, 79 TRUSTS & ESTATES 457 (1944), who asserts that few extra forms are in
fact required since an account may be opened in the trust department and a general ledger
maintained the same as for any trust. Id. at 457-60.
Bogert adds the objection that the funds permit the trustee to sell to itself, thereby
fostering a selfish interest opposed to the beneficiary. 3 BOGERT § 677. It seems unjusti-
fied to assume, however, that any trustee would thus expose itself to a revocation of the
tax advantages by so clearly violating the Federal Reserve Board's regulation. 12 CODE,
FED. REGS. § 206.17(a) (1938) (trustee prohibited from acquiring a non-fiduciary interest
in the fund). See the Board's application of this requirement to a specific case in 12
CODE FED. RFGs. § 206.101 (Supp. 1947). Bogert also criticizes the loss of individual
control entailed where funds are mixed, in that the beneficiary's particular needs are likely
to be neglected. But while it is true that many trusts are not appropriate for inclusion
in a common trust fund, others have no unusual investment and management require-
ments. The common trust fund is not intended to fit the needs of every settlor and bene-
ficiary. See Ward, The Rise of Common Trust Funds, 34 BANKING 32, 83 (Nov. 1941).
The common funds do raise some questions which can be settled by proper draftsman-
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While these obstructions to expanded trust service are diminishing in
general importance, there are, in the case of the small corporate trustee,
serious problems which must be solved before the common trust fund will
be practicable. Some of the smaller corporate trustees do not have enough
adaptable trusts at their disposal to set up a common trust fund of efficient
size.s The small institution may be further hampered by the difficulty of
meeting investment prerequisites. At present the normal investments of
most small companies are local securities of limited marketability which
require only the Trust Officer's knowledge of local affairs.P The successful
common trust fund, on the other hand, requires a large proportion of readily
marketable investments, 9 which in turn demand access to statistical services
and skilled personnel capable of handling periodic valuationsP The result
is that the common trust fund, with its considerable requirements in terms
of financial and personnel resources, is beyond the means of many smaller
institutions.
In the country as a whole there is a trust institution in but one county
in three.91 The further fact that 65.52% of our 3,000 trust companies are
institutions with less than one million dollars in trust assets 02 indicates
that many people have access only to small corporate trustees. Adapting
commingling principles to the small institution's needs therefore seems
necessary to round out the legal and practical availability of this important
trust device. The areas of possible development are already clearing. For
instance, small trustees might be granted permission to purchase partici-
pations in the fund of a large institution. 3 And the merits of a fund jointly
ship of statutes and regulations. For example, adequate provision should be made for
notice to interested parties prior to the trustee's court accounting. Sec Matter of Security
Trust Co, 1S9 Misc. 748, 757, 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 268 (Surr. Ct. 1947) (inadequate notice;
statute violates due process). Contra: Matter of Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 75
N.Y.S2d 397 (1947), aff'd, 80 N.Y.S2d 127 (1st Dept. 1948), disinissed or, froccdiural
grounds-, 121 N.YJ..J. 805 (Ct. App. March 4, 1949).
87. It is generally agreed that there is a minimum size for efficiency but the exact
amount is disputed. See, e.g., Moore, Before Starling a Conunon Find, 81 TnusTs
& EsTAT.Es 199 (1945) ($750,000); Commo. TRusr FuN-s 14 (200,000). The smallest
fund at present is $464,000. See note 82 supra and p. 937 mipra.
88. Fenninger, supra note 66, at 34.
89. Ibid. Under the Board's regulations, admissions and withdrawals may only be
made when the fund contains at least 40% cash and readily marketable securities. 12
CoDn FED. REGs. §206.17(c) (5) (1933). A readily marketable security is defined as one
"which is the subject of frequent dealings in ready markets with such frequent quotations
of price as to make (a) the price easily and definitely ascertainable and (b) the sccurity
itself easy to realize upon by sale at any time." Id. at n. 33.
90. Cozmox TRusr FuNus 15.
91. Stephenson, Trust Business in the United States, 1947, 27 Tnusr Btt.. 19, 25
(Apr. 1948).
92. Id. at 23.
93. See Stephenson, Taking Trust Serzice to the People, 27 Tnusr BuLL. 37, 50
(Nov. 1947). In some states it might also be possible for the small trustee to purdase
shares in investment trusts. See Ii. re Rees, Ohio App., Jan. 7, 1949, 88 TnusTs & EsTATszS
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owned and managed by a group of small trust companies should also be
explored.14 Possibly the management of such a fund could be delegated to
a larger fiduciary on an agency basis,95 or small institutions might obtain
enough outside help by hiring investment counsel." Moreover, the pos-
sibility of permitting a workable fund less complex than the present precisely
regulated plan should be considered.Y
With appropriate modifications to increase the common trust fund's
utility for small institutions, this revolutionary advance in trust adminis-
tration may achieve the eminence it deserves. Certainly the timorous
approach adopted by most corporate trustees is no longer warranted by the
facts. Failure to establish common funds where feasible not only deprives
the small investor of a valuable trust service but also ignores a largely un-
tapped source of profit to the trustee through substantial operational
economies.
Investments and services. A catalogue of the services to beneficiaries and
settlors performed by the corporate fiduciary would indicate the wide range
of activities which generate the out-of-pocket expenses involved in trustee-
ship. These include operations of a mechanical nature such as clipping bond
coupons, making remittances to beneficiaries and giving vault protection
to assets. Skilled activities such as investing in securities, fulfilling account-
ing duties and complying with taxation obligations also constitute a major
portion of the typical functions. And the whole process of managing real
estate and small business enterprises constitutes an important aspect of
the corporate fiduciaries' investment service.
128 (1949); Shattuck, Thorns in Trust Profession, 88 TRusTs & ESTATES 84, 105-6
(1949); Stevenson, Investment Company Shares, 85 TRUSTS & ESTATES 141 (1947).
Contra: Marshall v. Frazier, 159 Ore. 491, 80 P.2d 42 (1938).
94. See Wyatt, Supervisory Policies of the Federal Reserve System, 62 TRUST Co.
175 (1936) (suggested single common trust fund in one state); 6 P-H, TRUST SrnV.
10,061 (1948) ; 54 TRUST Co. 543 (1932) (address by J. W. White suggesting a single
or three divisional commingled funds for investment of assets in all life insurance trusts).
A variation of this approach would be establishment of bank-owned trust companies in
counties or trade areas. See Stone, Fifty Years of Trust Service, 28 TRUST BULL. 6, 9
(Sept. 1948). Trust business has already been successfully handled on a branch banking
basis. REmiNGTON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 91.
95. See Stephenson, Taking Trust Service to the People, 27 TRUST BULL. 37, 50
(Nov. 1947). Trust departments in twenty-seven banks affiliated with Northwest Ban-
corporation tried a much more extensive, though similar, scheme: the trust departments of
all affiliates were to be supervised by the central organization. The plan did not prove
feasible, however, probably because the members were far apart and all operating under
a number of different state laws. The central organization now merely compiles figures
for its 10 remaining members. See Drake, supra note 5, at 556.
96. See Steber, Should Small Banks Have Trust Departments? 88 TRusTs & ESTATES
98, 99 (1949) (discussing a current investigation by Pennsylvania fiduciaries into possible
solutions to the small bank's problems).
97. See discussion of "1200 Fund," note 66 supra. The need for amending the Board's




The great variety of these services and their diverse presence in any
particular trust pose a problem which any compensation system purporting
to be based on costs must face: how to conform the fee to the expenses of
trust services. In addition, any system must provide enough stability to
enable trustees and settlors to foretell the cost of the service with some
accuracy.
13
While present statutes and judicial decisions achieve stability and pre-
dictability by making the fees uniform for all trusts of a given sizeCO they
neglect to conform fees to the costs of trust service. In the case of their
contractual rates, some corporate trustees have already remedied this
defect by constructing an equitable fee schedule based on cost analysis of
typical accounts." Extension of this technique by calculating such costs
for all institutions rendering service of similar quality in a given trade
area,1' 1 would enable computation of average costs. With proper allowance
for responsibility and profit and transposition into percentage form, the
averaging of costs could make possible a uniform fee schedule founded on the
cost of performing ordinary services.
An alternative approach, utilized occasionally by trust companies in
quoting contractual fees and extensively by other common law countries
in their official schedules, is conforming the fee charged to the kind and
amount of trust activity carried on in the particular case.1 2 It has been
claimed that this method alone results in an equitable burden on every
account regardless of size.103 On the other hand, the itemization of services
might result in confusion and irritation to the beneficiary and, since it
sacrifices stability and predictability in the interest of exact conformance
to actual costs, would leave the trustee open to the charge that activity is
being created. 04
98. See Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204, 209 (Pa. 1823); Comment, 42 YA.n L.J.
771, 773 (1933).
99. See cases and statutes cited in note 43 supra.
100. See, e.g., Biggs, Profits-Past and Prescnt, 84 TRusrs & EsTAazs 321 (1947);
Cooch, Trist Fees Based on Cost Analysis, 83 TRusTs & EsTrAss 528 (1946).
101. Recognition would thus be given to the variance among the states in the average
level of such cost factors as trust size and duration and the expenses of maintaining trust
departments. See 40 Cok L. R-v. 558, 563 (1940).
102. Payne, Trust Compensation Based on Activity, 80 TRusTrs & EsrArS 139 (1945).
Such charges are regularly made by banks for checdng account service, SO TRusTs & Es-
TATES 461, 462 (1945), and by trust departments for corporate trust vork. ST EMnaso:.,
CONENSATION PRovIsIONs OF NVn.LS AND TRusT Aci- 'rs 9 (1941). Representative
schedules are collected by Stephenson in STUrms rN TRusT Busn;Ess 115-7 (1st series
1938).
103. See Payne, supra note 102, at 141. "Small trust accounts are profitable if the ac-
tivity is low, and large ones contrary if the activity is high. There is no rhyme or reason
for one account to offset the loss on one or more other accounts." Applying activity
schedules results on the average in an increase from customary percentage fees on accounts
up to $150,000, at which point the activity charge tends to decrease as compared vith the
percentage of income. Ibid. Compare similar statements by Lasseter, sntpra note 50, at 123.
104. See STEPHENsoN, STtwiEs iN TRusT BusinEss 117 (1st series 1933).
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Judges and legislators may not be willing to effect the wholesale departure
from traditional American policy involved in switching from proportion-
ately uniform schedules to cost-plus compensation. But they can utilize
the principles involved in the latter to supplement a system of uniform fee
schedules computed from ordinary costs. Many services, while not so re-
current as to warrant inclusion in averaged costs and a charge to all trusts,
are so standard that a uniform fee for rendering them can be set up. Filing
claims for the trust against assets of bankrupts, amending trust agreements,
rendering special reports at beneficiaries' requests and supervising the repair
of realty holdings are examples of special services for which an activity
charge would be particularly appropriate. The adoption of such supple-
mentary uniform schedules would add to the value of a system of uniform
charges based on costs.
But these uniform schedules based on composite costs for performing the
normal types of trust services would often be unsatisfactory unless accom-
panied by some adjusting mechanism. Many services of considerable value
to the trust estate are rarely ascertainable prior to assumption of trust
duties and, furthermore, defy cost standardization. Included in this class
are such "unusual" or "extraordinary" services as conducting litigation,
performing especially complex tax work, and participating in the reorgani-
zation of companies whose securities are part of the trust's assets. 105 The
growing tendency to include small business enterprises 103 and extensive
real estate holdings 117 as legitimate provinces for fiduciary management is
105. White, New Trends in Trust Compensation, 28 TRUST BULL. 18, 21-2 (Oct.
1948) and Stephenson, Compensation for Extraordinary Trust Services, 24 TRUST BULL.
25, 31-6 (Apr. 1945), list many of the services which could be considered unusual.
106. While a business venture is not itself a proper trust investment, see 3 BMoEar
§579; 2 ScoTT 1207, trustees may, and frequently do, accept accounts which involve pro-
longed supervision of a settlor's business. See McHenry, Successful Opcratlion of Busi.
ness Enterprises as Executor and Trustee, 27 TRUST BULL. 30 (Oct. 1947). Indications
are that trust institutions will be expected to administer such trusts to an increasing de-
gree as they expand their activities into non-metropolitan communities. Stephenson,
Taking" Trust Service to the People, 27 TRUST BULL. 37, 51 (Nov. 1947). And see
Foster, Property Management, 80 TRUsTs & ESTATES 285 (1945) (reporting very success-
ful operation of farming enterprises).
Where additional compensation is allowed for managing trusts which include business
enterprises, see note 108 infra, the basis for computing the fee has been the net income of
the business, Note, 99 A.L.R. 961, 964 (1935). Compare McHenry, snpra, at 35, unless
the trustee has already been compensated in another capacity, in which case the fee from
net income may be reduced. E.g., Estate of Peabody, 218 Wis. 541, 260 N.W. 444 (1935)
(salary as manager) ; ef. Spring v. Hawkes, 351 Pa. 602, 41 A.2d 538 (1945) (salary at
director and president of corporation). A different rule prevails in Australia, where gross
rather than net receipts are used as the basis for the trustee's fee, with beneficiaries pro-
tected from too high remuneration by application to the court for an adjustment, see Note,
19 AusT. L. J. 143 (1945).
107. "The care and management of real estate is as much a part of trust service as
is the management of stocks, bonds, and mortgages. It is a service as old, although not
alvays as well established, as are the other types of trust service." Dyste, Real Estate
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further evidence that unusual services to the trust should be treated sep-
arately.
Little has been done, however, to secure this needed flexibility except in
"reasonable compensation" states where the courts profess to consider all
relevant facts before making an award.i In states with statutory fees for
trustees the statutes seldom mention extraordinary services,' and none
specify the type of activity for which such compensation is to be granted.
And if the statutory schedule does not provide for payment for unusual
services, courts have commonly construed the omission as a denial of extra
compensation."10 This is likewise the prevailing result where compensation
agreements between the parties fail to provide for adjustments."'
Some statutory amelioration of this inflexibility seems clearly necessary.
But variety in fact situations renders set fee schedules impracticable. A
simple provision covering the procedure for obtaining additional allowances
from the courts, with the award left to the court's discretion, would be more
desirable.11 2 And the court's discretionary powers should be placed at the
disposal of beneficiaries as well, in order that justifiable reductions from the
uniform schedules may be made in appropriate cases."1 Only when a
uniform schedule of ordinary charges contains such elements of flexibility will
it be conducive to a satisfactory relationship between trustee and beneficiary.
Management for Profit, 28 TRUST BULT. 2, 3 (Nov. 1948), 87 TRusms & EsTATzs 416
(1948). See also Ross, Real Estate as a Trust Investment, 27 TRusT Buu. 30 (Nov.
1947).
Gross rather than net receipts is generally the basis for compensation for the trustee's
real estate management. See 2 Scor § 2421.
108. See 2 Scorr §2422; Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1835)
(business management); In re Thouron's Estate, 182 Pa. 126, 37 At. 861 (1897) (profit-
able sale of unproductive real estate).
109. Among the exceptions are MicH. Acrs, 1939, No. M, p. 614, and Ky. Rrv. STAT.
§ 386.180 (2) (Baldvin, 1943). Apparently only a half dozen other states provide by
statute for extraordinary compensation to trustees, although a large majority make such
provision for executors. See the chart in Stephenson, Compensation for Extraordinary
Trust Services, 24 TRuST Bui.t 25, 29 (Apr. 1945).
110. See 2 ScoTT 1388. Compare the cases cited in 4 Bocmrr § 976 n. 71.
111. 2 Scow §242.4; Matter of Froelich, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N.Y.Supp. 173 (2d
Dep't 1907) (denying extra compensation for managing stove-trimming business) ; Matter
of Stulman, 146 Misc. 861, 263 N.Y.Supp. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (lumber business). Com-
pare 3 BoG-= § 578.
112. A provision such as Mlichigan's would seem adequate. MIcE. Acrs 1939, No. 2,;S,
p. 614: "... . [S]uch allowance [for extraordinary services] shall only be made upon the
filing of a petition therefor, setting forth in detail such extraordinary services, or the rea-
sons for considering the case one of unusual difficulty or responsibility, and the order
making such allowance shall recite in detail the extraordinary services for which such
allowance is made, giving the amount allowed for each item thereof, or the reasons
for considering the case one of unusual difficulty or responsibility; and in case the order
does not contain such recitals as herein required, the same shall be void and of no effect."
113. Compare Rule 132(d) of the Delaware Court of Chancery which provides for a
decrease of commissions in certain cases where the control of investments rests in some-
one other than the trustee or where the investment is in large blocks of securitiec
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Multiple trust fees. Where one or more individuals are made co-trustees
with the corporate fiduciary, their contribution may reduce the corpor-
ation's costs. 11 4 On the other hand, co-trusteeship may, and frequently
does, increase cost by hampering efficient administration."' In either case,
it is pertinent to consider whether a single fee or multiple fees should be
allowed and how either method can be related to actual costs.
One system for handling these co-trusteeships, which exists in several
states, is to divide a single fee either equally 116 or in proportion to services
rendered.11 7 The opposite method is to allow multiple fees, with the total
amount depending solely on the number of trustees. The multiple fees too
may be equal 11 or allocated in proportion to each fiduciary's services.110
An intermediate view more flexible than either of these is simply to award
each co-trustee compensation reasonable in the light of its services."'0 This
permits an amount greater than a single fee where warranted, but prevents
an unduly burdensome levy.
A further advantage of the flexible fee system, in addition to its conform-
ance to cost, would be its tendency to promote the institution of co-trustee-
ship. Individual trustees are frequently appointed because the settlor feels
their knowledge and training can contribute to the corporate trustee's
administration of the trust.'2 ' There are also instances where family
reasons, such as the desire to assure that a lively personal interest will be
taken in the needs of the beneficiaries, have motivated the settlor in making
the designation. 1 22 Today these useful objectives are difficult to attain, for
114. Shattuck, Thorns in Trust Profession, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 84 (1949) suggests
economic advantages where the instrument divides the duties in such a way that the
corporation gets sole custody and full management power over the trust fund while the
family problems are left for the individual trustee.
115. Ibid; Stayer, Should Trtst Companies Encourage or Discourage Co-Trsiteeslips?
26 TRUST BULL. 17, 18 (Sept 1946).
116. Kilpatrick v. Robert, 278 Mo. 257, 212 S.W. 884 (1919); cf. Taylor v. Taylor,
223 Ky. 799, 4 S.W.2d 752 (1928) (co-executors) ; 2 ScorT § 242.10.
117. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:11-6 (1939); Huggins v. Rider, 77 Ill. 360 (1875);
cf. Slingerland v. Norton, 136 Minn. 204, 161 N.W. 497 (1917).
118. In New York, up to three full fees are permitted where the trust exceeds $100,000.
N.Y. CIVIL PmAcicE ACT § 1548(6) ; N.Y. SuRi. COURT Acr § 285-a (6).
119. This is the method used in New York where there are more than three co-trustees
of a $100,000 trust or where co-trustees serve in a trust of less than $100,000. Ibid.
120. See 2 ScoTr 1401; cf. Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 At. 341 (1923);
McCaskey's Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 160 Atl. 707 (1932).
121. Stayer, supra note 115, at 21-2. See, generally, STrpuENsoX, STUDIES xN TRusT
BusiNEss 173-6 (lst series 1938).
122. Joining an individual and a corporation as co-trustees was once advocated as a
desirable combination of the family friend's personal judgment and direction with the
corporation's experience, responsibility and equipment. SEA1s, op. cit. supra note 4, at
82. In spite of the waning enthusiasm of corporate trustees, many distinguished estate
planners still advise co-trusteeship, frequently in the form of a committee consisting of the
bank, a family advisor and a member of the family. Shattuck, Thorns in Trust Profes-
sion, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 84, 85 (1949).
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the corporate trustee, which usually loses by the arrangement under present
fee schedules, is loath to accept the duty.12 3 Individual co-trustees, on the
other hand, could in many cases be persuaded to accept the trust at lesser
fees than they now receive from courts and legislatures. Thus, by con-
forming fees to services, the corporate fiduciaries' reluctance can be over-
come without an unjustified rise in the cost of co-trusteeship to settlors. -1 2 4
A second problem involving multiple fees arises where the corporate
executor turns over assets to itself as trustee under a decedent's testamentary
trust. In this situation, some of the services performed and compensated
for in the executorship 12- may effect a reduction in the cost of the trustee-
ship. 1 6 This possibility should receive some recognition in the trust fee.
In states following the reasonable compensation doctrine, naming the
same fiduciary as both executor and trustee raises no particular difficulty.
The extent to which the dual capacity has affected the fiduciary's duties
and responsibilities is considered in awarding a reasonable sum."- Where
123. Contrast Stephenson's report of the corporate fiduciaries' practice as to accepting
co-trusteeships in 17 TRUST Bumi. 27, 28 (far. 1938) with his report in 27 Tnusr BULL.
26, 40-4 (Jan. 1948).
124. New Zealand's Public Trustee escaped most of the difficulties inherent in co-
trusteeship without sacrificing its benefits by developing a system of advisory trustees.
The safeguards and facilities of the Public Trustee have been preserved by not requiring
joint action and responsibility and, at the same time, both the Trustee and the beneficiaries
have secured the benefit of expert and trusted advice on discretionary matters. See Baird,
Advisory Trustees, 87 TRusTs & EsTATEs 167, 168 (1948). Corporate trustees might
well profit from more extensive use of such an arrangement particularly where they ac-
cept the supervision of a business enterprise. See note 106 supra.
125. Executor's fees are generally regulated in the -came manner as trustee's fces:
they may be allowed by the court in its absolute or limited discretion or they may be
fixed by statute. See Comment, 42 YAE L. J. 771 (1933). Where statutory schedules
are prescribed, the fee is usually based on the value of the property handled by the exec-
utor rather than on the income received during his administration. See Shelton, Com-
parative Fees of Executors, 81 TnusTs & ESTATES 491 (1945).
126. See Report of Commnittee on Costs and Charges. Trust Section, North Carolina
Bankers Association, 8 P-H TRuST SERv. 1 14,746 (1948), which recommends that the
executor-trustee's annual principal commission as trustee should not begin until after the
first ten years of the trust in recognition of services to principal performed and compen-
sated for as executor.
127. E.g., State Nat Bank v. Fisher, 186 Ark. 42, 52 SAV2d 51 (193V2); Arnold v.
Alden, 173 Ill. 229, 50 N.E. 704 (189) ; Tyler v. Reynolds, 120 W.Va. 232 197 S.-. 735
(1938).
Pennsylvania had the only statutory prohibition against awarding more than one
principal commission to an executor-trustee. Pa. Laws 1864, no. 52, as reenacted, PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 813 (Purdon, 1938). The repeal of this prohibition in 1945 was
inconclusive, Pa. Laws 1945, no. 90, and left the present status of executor-trustee com-
missions in some doubt. The leading case thus far rejected any implication that Penn-
sylvania fiduciaries are now entitled to additional compensation as a matter of right
and declined a requested allowance on the ground that the trustee had already been
adequately compensated as executor for such services as she had rendered in her dual
capacity. Snow's Estate, 58 D. & C. 485 (Pa. 1947). A corporate trustee has now
prepared a case which will be carried through to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
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fees are fixed by statute, however, they may be interpreted as requiring
double commissions for handling the same property without regard to the
measure of service performed.'2 But the more desirable analysis denies the
second statutory compensation on the principal unless the two functions
are clearly differentiated. 129 This is, in effect, a requirement that the exec-
utor-trustee actually earn the compensation which it seeks. As such, this
rule may be readily adapted to the overall objective of conforming fees to
costs.
Some deviation from uniform schedules set up to cover the single fee
situation will usually be required where the contributions of co-trustees and
executor-trustees are thus measured. This necessity for an increase or
decrease from the standard allowance need not, however, eliminate the
predictability of the uniform fee system. The compensation of the sole
trustee would remain as a standard of measurement, and deviations from
this standard to allow payments to co-trustees and executor-trustees would
themselves become increasingly predictable as the system continued in
operation.
Operating risk losses. Every business venture must face the possibility
that in the course of its operations it may make mistakes which will add to
its costs. The fiduciary, however, faces an additional hazard growing out
of its responsibility for the funds entrusted to its control: if the trustee
in an effort to establish a rule which will permit the additional fee as a general practice.
Communication to the YAm LAW JoURNAL from George C. Robinson, Trust Operations
Officer, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., Jan. 25, 1949. Voluminous testimony has been
taken in the trial court for the purpose of establishing a factual basis to the increased
costs and decreased income, which corporate fiduciaries claim is characteristic of their
personal trust business. See Record of Testimony, Estate of Ella Williamson, Orphan's
Court of Philadelphia County, December 8, 1947. The trustee in this case is also attack-
ing the Pennsylvania rule as to the time for taking the principal commission. See note
162 infra.
128. See Note, Double Compensation for Testamentary Fiduciary Acting as Both
Executor and Trustee, 44 YALE L.J. 523, 526 (1935); 4 BOGERT § 978; 2 ScoTT § 242.9.
The double commission problem may also arise in other dual-fiduciary situations. E.g.,
Rose v. Bank of Wadesboro, 217 N.C. 600, 9 S.E.2d 2 (1940) (administrator-guardian
granted two commissions); see Patterson v. Old Dom. Trust Co., 149 Va. 597, 615, 140
S.E. 810, 815 (1927) (trustee-special commissioner denied two commissions).
129. For a clear analysis, see Bemmerly v. Woodard, 136 Cal. 326, 68 Pac. 1017 (1902).
New York accepts as the criterion of separation whether the will clearly distinguishes
between the two functions. Compare Matter of Schlieman, 259 N.Y. 497, 182 N.E. 153
(1932) (double compensation granted) with Matter of Ziegler, 218 N.Y. 544, 113 N.E.
553 (1916) (double compensation denied). See the cases collected in Note, 84 A.L.R. 667
(1932).
In the few states in which executorships and testamentary trusteeships are admin-
istered under the supervision of separate courts, (e.g., Di. Rav. Cooy c. 98 (1935),
executorships-Register of Wills; id. at § 4400, trusteeships-Court of Chancery), the pro-
cedural separation appears to be along functional lines. The fact that the testamentary
trustee previously served as executor does not then affect the compensation allowed in the
trusteeship. Communication to the YArE LAW JOURNAL from James W. Allison, Vice
President, Equitable Trust Co., Wilmington, Delaware, January 19, 1949.
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fails to perform the duties imposed under the trust as would a man of or-
dinary prudence in like circumstances, he will be liable to respond in dam-
ages for any loss.' ' Where bonds as security against these losses are re-
quired of corporate fiduciaries, 131 their cost is passed on to the trust estate.1 32
And where the fiduciary acts as a self-insurer, in effect pledging its assets
as security for the prudent performance of trust duties, the establishment
of reserves to absorb compromise settlements and surcharges is a recognized
cost factor in trustees' compensation.' 33
Scientific prediction of losses is hampered by at least two uncertainties.
First, the probability of negligence will vary with the skill and internal
organization of each fiduciary. 3 4 Second, the extent to which depression
stimuli will induce beneficiaries to seek surcharges is equally uncertain."35
But the problem does not appear insuperable, for surety companies have
dealt with it successfully in valuing their services to trustees.' A sub-
stantially equitable calculation might even be made by simply utilizing
the average annual loss figure for a representative past period."7
130. 3 BOGERT c. 32; Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelley, 333 IlL App.
119, 76 N.E.2d 82-0 (1948) (forfeiture of compensation due to self-dealing). It can b2
argued that the corporate trustee should be held to a greater degree of care than the indi-
vidual nonprofessional trustee since it holds itself out as a specialist in the field. 2 Scorr
§ 174.1. But see Moore, supra note 28, at 653.
131. See, e.g., MID. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 259 (Flack, 1939) ; id. at § 259A (Flacl, Cum.
Supp. 1947). Bond and surety requirements by states are charted in Cole, Bonding of
Corporate Trustee Unnecessarily Burdens Estates, 24 TRu s BuLL. 20 (Sept. 1944).
132. Cole, supra note 131, at 21. Such requirements can be, and often are, waived in
the trust instrument. Callahan, The Factor of Responsibility in Corporate T17!tees' Com-
pensation, 25 TRusr Bu.L. 30, 32 (Dec. 1945).
133. Stephenson, Responsibility as a Factor in Trust Compensation, 25 TnusT Bu.L.
21, 22-3 (Apr. 1946). See Ha3ood v. Plant, 93 Conn. 374, 384-5, 119 At. 341, 345
(1923) ; Will of Des Forges, 243 Wis. 178, 1S6-7, 9 N.WT-2d 609, 616 (1943). Pennsyl-
vania is the only state which has actually formulated a rule for measuring responsibility
as an element of compensation. Stevenson's Estate, 4 Whart. 97, 103 (Pa. 1839); De-
Vilder's Appeal, 43 D.&C. 291, 298 (Pa. 1941) (2%% of inventory in e-ecutorships).
134. See MacLennan, Trust Cost Accounting, 86 TnusTs & EsTATZS 409, 413 (1943).
135. See Moore, supra note 28, at 647.
136. Callahan, spra note 132, at 30, suggests a comparison with the surety as a means
of calculating the responsibility factor.
137. RoBiNso-, CosT AccoUNTING roR BANxs kND Tnusr Comurms 57 (1947)
(cited hereafter as ROBINSoN, COST AccouNrING).
Vhen calculating the appropriate charge, some weight should probably be given to
the selectivity with which trustees undertake their obligations and to the elaborate system
of internal safeguards employed to control decisions, see Srmium'soN, TnE A.mnic,:
SYs= OF TRusT BusinEss c.8 (1936), coupled with government supervision to ensure
that these safeguards are utilized. See, generally, 4 BOGERT § 920; NEILa., Tnusr EN-
A=INATION passim (1939). Some recognition of these factors of care and responsibility
has already been given by legislatures in abandoning bond requirements for corporate
fiduciaries, see e.g., TER. STAT. ANN., arts. 4982, 4983 (Vernon, 1940), and by surety com-
panies in quoting rates to them a third-lower than to individual trustees. 25 Tnusr BULL.
2 (Dec. 1945). Settlors also take the corporate trustees' greater financial responsibility
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Summary
Conforming fees to services, if coupled with efficient operational tech-
niques, will put trust departments on an independent paying basis. Sub-
sidization of the department or of particular fiduciary activities will then
be unnecessary. As changes in the general level of costs take place, the same
techniques of cost analysis which are essential to instituting uniform sched-
ules can be utilized, with relatively little time lag, to adjust rates to the new
conditions.
Putting theory to work
Discovering the facts. Before any system of trustee compensation can
be devised, it is necessary to know more about the trust business than call
be gleaned from statute and decision. One of the major difficulties encoun-
tered in any objective apprais'al of the corporate fiduciary's compensation
is the lack of official sources of information. Significant trust statistics are
almost non-existent 13 and impartial investigations by governmental
authorities have been conducted only in New York. 139
Responsibility for the lack of statistics and informative studies must rest
largely on those state legislatures and banking departments which have
failed to realize the necessity for an informed attitude toward a business
which controls, in personal trust accounts alone, 36 billion dollars of liquid
assets. 4 ' Many influential trustmen would apparently welcome the interest
into consideration by contractually relieving them from the bond requirement. See note
132 supra.
138. The Comptroller of the Currency is the only federal agency at present publishing
trust statistics as part of its annual report. The information contained is limited in scope
and confined to the fiduciary activities of national banks without any breakdown along
regional or state lines. ANNUAL REPORT OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY 177-8 (1948), At
least five state banking departments (Massachusetts, Connecticut, California, Illinois,
Pennsylvania) publish statistics, but these vary in scope and utility. See Stephenson,
Statistics of Trust Business, 27 TRUST BULL. 14, 23-4 (May 1948).
All trust statistics, official and unofficial, suffer from the present lack of any system
approaching uniform valuation of the trust funds. The four methods generally employed
-cost-or-inventory, par-or-face, unit control, and assessed value-lead to widely varying
results and bear no relationship to current market values. Id. at 15. But see Zara, The
Statistical Tower of Babel, 64 TRUST Co. 407, 410 (1937).
Periodic revaluation to market value seems a better basis for statistics than any of
the foregoing systems, because it is meaningful in terms of the quality of securities held,
and is, in effect, so recognized and endorsed by federal regulation. National banks are
required to determine the current value of their investment at least once every twelve
months. 12 CODE FED. REGS. § 206.6(c) (1938). And the Federal Reserve Board's regula-
tion on common trust funds requires a valuation at quarterly periods. 12 Cons FED. R os.
§ 206.17(c) (4) (Supp. 1945). Moreover, pay-as-you-go schedules may make the cur-
rent value of principal an important consideration. See p. 953 supra. The problems
involved in persuading trust companies to adopt this method in pursuance of the goal of
more adequate statistics are discussed and evaluated by Stephenson, supra at 16-22.
139. See note 34 supra.
140. See note 5 supra.
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of officials in the collection of trust facts."' And such a development ap-
pears essential before any significant progress can be made in conforming
trust fees to services performed.
Essentiality of cost accounting and cost analysis. The amazing neglect of
cost accounting in trust work is, like the paucity of official statistics, a
barrier to any compensation reform. 142 It is, moreover, an obstacle of
particular concern when an attempt is made at conforming the fee system to
costs.
The failure to use cost accounting procedure can hardly be explained on
the basis of institutional size, since both large and small trust companies
have overlooked its possibilities. 143 This neglect may be due to a lingering
attitude on the part of bank directors that trust business is a side-line ac-
tivity, with its losses properly underwitten by the bank as a whole. 144 Or
it may derive from the mistaken belief that there are innate complexities 145
and expenses 1I" incident to establishing and conducting effective cost ac-
counting.
141. See 67 TnusT Co. 461 (1938); Zara, supra note 13S, at 407; Theis, The Xccd
for Accurate Trust Statistics, 15 TRuST BuLT. 15 (Nov. 1935).
142. The Chairman of the Committee on Costs and Charges, Trust Division, A.LB.A.,
has summarized the current status of cost accounting as follows: "In spite of the fact that
this committee has continued ever since [1929] to preach the gospel of determining trust
costs to trust institutions from coast to coast and regardless of similar endeavors by com-
mittees formed by state and local fiduciary associations, the progress to date has been
most disappointing." Wilson, Some Suggestions for Tak:ing the Guess 11ork Out of
Trust Profits, 28 TRusT BuL.. 4 (Oct. 1948). Pennsylvania has led all other states in the
development of trust- cost accounting, yet only one out of every four departments has a cost
accounting system. 88 TRusTs & ESTATES 43 (1949).
Banking as a whole suffers from a like neglect. See ROBUnso:z, CoST Accou:;n. SS:
"For some unknown reason cost accounting has not as a general rule, been looked upon
with favor by bankers. A hostile attitude on the part of bank management has retarded
the development of cost accounting!'
143. Wilson, supra note 142, at 5; 88 TRusrs & EsTrns 43 (1949) (reporting $100,-
000,000 departments without any apparent interest in knowing their profit or loss).
144. If a trust department is in fact losing money, this attitude may be prejudicial to
the interests of stockholders who have invested funds in the bank as a whole with some
expectation of gain from trust activities and to bank customers who pay for the burden
of trust work in increased fees for services rendered by the saving and commercial de-
partments. See Wilson, supra note 142, at 6-7. A steadily losing department may also
manifest its ills in the form of lower quality service. Ibid. Schwalm, Tritst Scrtice at a
Profit, 84 Tauss & EsTATEs 631, 632 (1947).
145. Cf. Lasseter, Taking Guesswork Out of Trust Costs, 35 Tnusrs & EsrA.s 57,
124 (1947): "There is no trust department too small for a cost study and it is inconceivable
that a bank or trust company qualified to render fiduciary services does not have among
its trust or auditing personnel someone who could do a thoroughly creditable job of a
study." See pp. 950-1 supra.
146. See RoanNsoN, CosT AccouNTrNG 58: "Cost accounting expense can be controlled
just as any other expenses. Any figure set by management within reason .ill be suffi-
cient. Several of the largest banks in the country employ only two clerks on cost ac-
counting procedure and achieve substantially accurate results. One large ban: operates
with only one clerk."
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Whatever may be the reasons for its neglect, cost accounting is clearly
needed in trust work. As in other businesses, it can make possible both
better service 147 and lower expenses. 148 Particularly in the case of the cor-
porate trustee, the intangible cost factors demand scientific control, 1 9
Furthermore, at a time when corporate fiduciaries are seeking greater com-
pensation, and need some equitable basis to attain it, the first step must be
cost accounting.
The further step of the cost analysis of individual accounts based on a
previous practice of cost accounting contains the key to advance in the
principles of trust compensation. Extrastatutory arrangements among the
parties become practicable only when specific costs are transposed into a
fee schedule uniformly and impartially applied. 50 And courts and legis-
latures would hardly be justified in abandoning customary yardsticks for
new fee schedules until the basis is laid by thorough investigation of
fiduciary costs.
Specifically, what is needed is knowledge of the trustee's profit and loss
(1) from total trust operations, (2) from each class of service such as testa-
mentary trusts and executorships and (3) from each individual account
carried by the company.' The basic approach is essentially a refinement
of the income and expense accounts already maintained by all trust in-
147. Id. at 1-2. Corporate fiduciaries have been frequently scored for their failure to
use modern operational methods and to revise now antiquated practices for the review and
management of securities. See, e.g., Shelor, Trust Business Can Be Profitable, 80 TitUSTS
& ESTATES 41, 42-4 (1945) (setting forth a number of steps to better management, includ-
ing cost accounting).
148. "The possibilities for controlling expenses by means of cost accounting figures are
practically innumerable and will depend largely upon the size of the organization and the
initiative of the cost accountant." RoBINsON, COST ACCOUNTING 3. See, also, the same
author's Trust Department Expense Control, 86 TRusTs & ESTATES 109 (1948) (signif-
icance of the combination of cost accounting, activity control, budgets and strong manage-
ment).
149. In contrast with industrial enterprises, the tangible cost factors involved in
rendering services are confined to such minor items as stationery. Salaries account for the
major expense, see Hoyle, New Trust Cost Analysis, 87 TRUSTS & ESTATES 171, 172-3
(1948) (46 trust departments: salaries over 70%; occupancy of quarters nearly 99), and,
unlike industrial costs, cannot be individually applied to the product. RODINSON, CosT
ACCOUNTiNG 7. It is thus obvious that some method for ascertaining and controlling per-
sonnel and other overhead costs is essential if expenses are to be lowered. They must
be lowered, many trustmen believe, if profits are to be increased, since fees are about as
high as the market will bear. See, e.g., Phelan, Post-War Market for Trust Service, 80
TRUSTS & ESTATES 31 (1945). But Alton, Adequate Compensation for Trustees, 27
TRuST BuLL.. 5, 6 (Dec. 1937), expresses doubt as to the likelihood of costs being con-
trolled because of free services to the government such as tax collection.
150. See ROBINSON, COST AccouNTING 4-5. Renegotiation of the compensation for
outstanding trusts has been particularly effective where a standard cost basis has been
employed. See, e.g., 87 TRUSTS & ESTATES 472, 473 (1948) (Old Colony Trust Co. of
Boston has renegotiated 2334 accounts-80% of its personal trusts).
151. Lasseter, su/pra note 145, at 57.
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stitutions.15 2 One of the principal procedures used "I is to classify total
expenses according to type (salaries, rent, insurance, etc.151), thus enabling
expenses to be allocated to major work units (testamentary trust, guardian-
ship, etc.), and a unit cost determined for each type of service performed.
Application of unit costs to the activity of each trust account then yields
a cost figure for the trust from which net profit or loss may be readily cal-
culated. 155 Infinite variation in detail and procedure may be devised by
competent accountants facing particular sets of institutional problems.'-'
Corporate trustees which institute an adequate cost accounting system
and cost-analyze their individual accounts will then be in a position to
exert scientific control over expenses and factually justify requests for in-
creased compensation. However, in order to achieve the maximum benefits
from the potentials inherent in cost accounting, a uniform procedure should
be adopted by all the trust companies in a particular trade area. It would
then be possible to compare costs for the purpose of developing more ef-
ficient operational methods.'1 A pool of cost figures would not only provide
the facts prerequisite to convincing courts and legislatures that the present
inadequate fee system should be replaced, but would also constitute the in-
formation required to effectuate a system of compensation based on costs. t 3
WHO SHOULD PAY AND WHEN
Percentages representing costs do not alone make a fee schedule. In order
to yield a dollars and cents compensation, these percentages must be ap-
plied either against income, to the detriment of the income beneficiary, or
against principal which otherwise would go to the remainderman. At
present the fee comes largely from annual income payments, but usually
there is also a commission based on a fixed percentage of the principal.
Where a principal commission is allowed, the trustee and the income
beneficiary are both concerned with the time of its payment. From the
trustee's viewpoint, a 2% principal commission on a twenty-year trust taken
at inception is worth twice as much as the same commission at termina-
152. See Robinson's chapter entitled "Fundamentals of Bank Cost Accounting," CCst
AccouZMnGi c. 2.
153. Lasseter, supra note 145, at 57 ct scq. Compare the somewhat similar method
suggested in Wilhoit, Case History in Tru7st Cost Study, 87 TRUSTS & E TAaS 99 (1943).
154. A table of major and minor classifications with the basis for their alkcation to
departments, divisions and expense units has been compiled by Row:.soN, CoST AccoUNT-
ING c. 4.
155. See id. at 9-10 for a graphic presentation of the whole procedure in the form of
an expense flow chart.
156. Id. at 49; Lasseter, supra note 145, at 57. For suggested accounting methods de-
signed particularly to meet the needs of small institutions, see Laffoley, Machine Account-
ing for Smzaller Trusts Departments, 8 TRusTs & EST.rES 111 (1949); Weig, A Cost
System for a Personal Trust Account in a Small Trust Department, 22 Tnusr Bum.
7 (July-Aug. 1943).
157. See Weig, Trust Costs-A Giide to Trust Fees, 25 TansT Bum. 3 (May 1946).
158. See, generally, RoaiNsoN, COST AccouNTNG c. 15.
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tion."9 The income beneficiary, on the other hand, loses by a payment at the
beginning, for he then will receive the income on only 98% of the original
investment. Apart from these considerations, payment of principal com-
mission in a lump sum seems markedly less fair than annual payments. The
amount of the lump sum is inherently fortuitous, in that it depends on
the state of the economic cycle in the year of payment. When the prin-
cipal commission is paid annually, the total fee eventually received fairly
represents the value of the assets over the life of the trust.
The importance of considering who should pay the trustee and when the
compensation should be taken was not reflected in standard practices until
recently. At the time that these practices were solidifying into statute and
court rule, realty was the predominant corpus of nearly all trusts.' 00 The
impracticability of collecting an annual fee from principal gave rise to the
procedure of delaying such compensation until termination of the trust,
when the property would be distributed in liquid form. Although trusts are
now composed largely of readily marketable property,"' the old practice
is to a considerable extent still followed.
6 2
Lump sum payment of the principal commission, with annual compen-
sation confined to income, proved satisfactory as long as the prime objective
of trusteeship was conserving the trust res. But when trustees became active
managers with the duty to make the property productive for life bene-
ficiaries, 63 both the beneficiary and the trustee got caught in the squeeze
between higher costs and a lower return on trust investments. At the same
time, settlors began to extend their trusts to the maximum duration per-
mitted by law in order to effectuate tax savings. 16 4 But the principal com-
mission remained the same regardless of the trust's duration.10
159. E.g, 2% of the principal at inception, if compounded annually at 4%, would be
worth 4.38% of the same sum at termination. STEPHENsoN, SruDIEs iu TRUST BusimSs
108 (1st series 1938).
160. See White, "Pay-as-You-Go" Trust Compensation, 26 TRusT BuLL. 4, 5 (Dec.
1946).
161. See note 26 supra.
162. See Scott, The Law of Trusts, 1941-1945, 59 HAav. L. Rnv. 157, 195 (1945).
Pennsylvania is one of the major jurisdictions in which the trustee is compelled to
wait until termination. See Wilson, Extraordinary and Interim Trust Fees, 84 TRUSTS
& ESTATEs 627, 629 (1947). The general rule has been recently stated in Powers' Estate,
58 D. & C. 379, 381-2 (Pa. 1947) : ". . . [A] trustee is not entitled to a commission on
the principal of an estate until the trust expires, or the particular trustee's relation to It
ends .... unless there are circumstances of an unusual and extraordinary character,
and the trustee has increased the estate by great care and skill." See note 127 supra.
163. See note 2 supra.
164. White, New Trends in Trust Compensation, 28 TRUST BuLL. 13, 14 (Oct. 1948)
86 TRUSTS & ESTATES 45,46 (1948).
165. Where the term is short, the lump sum award of an unvarying principal com-
mission may, of course, be unfair to the beneficiaries. If the trust is of long duration,
the trustee may find it inequitable. In many circumstances, an individual trustee will find
it more so than a corporate trustee. For instance, individual trustees who die prior to
termination of the trust not only are denied the fruits of their labors in their lifetime, but
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The desire to remedy this inadequacy, as well as to apportion the burden
of current expense between income beneficiaries and remaindermen,lc- has
led to introduction of the pay-as-you-go concept, a distribution of the annual
commission between both principal and income.' Under such a plan,
remaindermen receive less principal than heretofore, the difference usually
being distributed between a greater return for income beneficiaries and an
increased total commission for the trustee. Equally important to the trustee,
pay-as-you-go plans spread his earnings throughout the life of the trust
their heirs are penalized by reductions through inheritance, estate and income taxes le%ied
at high brackets due to the addition of the full sum to the estate in a single year. Where
the trust terminates during the individual trustee's lifetime, the lump sum payment will
again push the taxpayer into a higher income tax bracket. And the individual trustee can
seldom, if ever, benefit from a tax adjustment under the lump sum provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code; for such adjustment to be made the Code requires the receipt of
807 of the total commission in a lump sum, IiNT. REv. Corz § 107(a), and the annual
income commission would almost invariably be more than 207 of the total. For a fuller
statement of the individual trustee's position, see Brief of T. Williams Roberts, an Indi-
vidual Trustee, as Amicus Curiae, Estate of Ella Williamson, Orphans' Court of Philadel-
phia County, Dec. 8, 1947. The compensation reforms advocated in this comment are
thus of concern to the individual as well as the corporate trustee.
166. This ideal of charging to each income beneficiary and remainderman the costs in-
curred in advancing his interest is not a goal of all pay-as-you-go plans. Thus, while
most present plans provide for an annual charge on income and one on principal, in some
localities, notably in western states, the entire fee is based on principal alone. White,
New Trends in Trust Compensation, 28 TRusT B.u. 13, 16 (Oct. 1948). Moreover, it is
possible to measure the rate against both principal and income and yet actually tale the
fee exclusively from one or the other source. See STEPrINson, Swums ni Trusv" Busr-
xNss 107-8 (1st series 1938) ; Delaware Chancery Court, Rule 132(g) (charitable and
other perpetual trusts).
167. About half the states now have statutes permitting such methods of compensation.
E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6903(3) (1949) ; Wis. STAT. § 320.03 (1947). See U:,rro.i
PRINCIPAL AND INcomE Acr § 12. Three of the statutes contain schedules to be applied
annually against principal and income. Ky. REv. STAT. §386.180(1) (Baldwin, 1943);
M1. CoDE ANN., art. 16, § 280 (Flac, 1939) ; N.Y. Crvi. Pw.cricr Acr § 1543(3), M.Y.
Sump. CouaRT Acv § 285-a (3). The fact that a state operates under the "reasonable com-
pensation" rule does not foreclose the possibility of a pay-as-you-go schedule. See Del-
aware Chancery Court, Rule 132; cf. James, Fornutda Plan for Trusts, 8 TnusTs & Es-
TATEs 153 (1949) (quoting the annual compensation rule of a lower court in California).
White, New Trends in Trust Compensation, 28 TRUST BULL. 13, 25-9 (Oct. 1948),
reproduces in comparative form the contractual pay-as-you-go schedules presently utilized
by the fiduciaries in 29 cities throughout the country who are operating under such plans.
The chief drawback to pay-as-you-go plans under current practices is the lack of
any uniform method of valuation. This is particularly disadvantageous in view of the
fact that the annual commission is generally retained without filing an annual account.
But a solution to the valuation problem does appear to be evolving. See note 138 .supra.
Compare the New York statute which makes original value presumptive of the current
value with the option open to revalue on another basis. N.Y. Crvir. Pnmcrtcz Act
81548(3), N.Y. Sum. CouRT AcT § 285-a(3).
Cases involving the interpretation of the New York statute are cited in Niles, Trusts
and Administration, 22 N.Y. U. L.Q. REv. 799, 807-8 (1947).
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rather then concentrating them at termination; 163 and where each annual
payment is based on the value of the corpus at that time, compensation
tends to vary with the business cycle.
Pay-as-you-go plans do not, however, provide a complete answer to the
problem of the effect of cyclical fluctuations, for changes in valuation of the
corpus may not accurately reflect changes in trustees' costs. Moreover, it
is too impractical to adjust uniform schedules to costs at every fluctuation
of the economy.'69 The only complete cure would be to abandon entirely
the income-principal basis for compensation in favor of an ad hoc cost-plus
policy.7 0 And it is at least debatable whether such a policy might not
dampen the trustee's incentive to render efficient service of good quality-
an incentive retained where the exigencies of the market are allowed some
play in determining the amount of compensation. It would seem, therefore,
that adjustment of the uniform schedules to account for long range rises
and falls in the general level of costs would be sufficient to keep the fees on
an equitable basis.
CONCLUSION
In the last half century, the corporate trustee, a minor offspring of the
insurance business, has come into its majority. Whether it has also attained
social maturity depends on its ability to meet the needs of the small in-
vestor. Indeed the whole future pattern of institutionalized trusteeship
will be affected by the solution to the vexing problem of how to render
quality service at a reasonable price. Improved operational techniques
such as cost analysis and the common trust fund, coupled with a revised
compensation system which conforms to costs, appear to be the answer.
But if there is some unlikely incompatability of profit with trusteeship
which prevents reform from resulting in needed trust facilities, a non-profit
public trustee may well be the only resort for the small investor.
At any rate, the corporate trustee should no longer be required to seek
out the answer on its own. Customary fees applicable to the individual
fiduciary have congealed into the law governing the institutionalized trustee
due to the acceptance of that custom by court and legislature. Any effective
change must come from them. If state supervisory authorities realize this,
they have not manifested their realization in any integrated form. The
essential task of giving effect to the public's interest in the broad field of
fiduciary reform still awaits their attention.
168. See 40 CoL. L. Rxv. 558, 561-2 (1940).
169. But see Bardt, Flexible Compensation, 88 TRUsTs & ESTAmS 80, 82 (1949) who
advocates a year-to-year revision on the basis of then prevailing costs.
170. See note 102 supra and p. 941 supra.
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